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This paper asks what role property taxes play in an optimal commodity tax scheme. The
question is motivated by the crucial role of property taxes in ﬁnancing public goods in the
United States. In 2004, state and (mostly) local governments raised over $324 billion in
property tax revenue, an amount equal to more than 20 percent of state and local expen-
ditures and close to 10 percent of all US government outlays, exclusive of federal deﬁned
beneﬁts. Property taxes are the second largest source of tax revenue in the United States
after the individual income tax, again excluding social insurance and retirement receipts.1
US property taxes are economically interesting in part because they combine a tax on land
rents with distortive taxes, at the same rate, on land development and housing structures.
Taxes on pure rents are generally desirable but distortive taxes on commodities in inﬁnitely
elastic supply are typically undesirable, even in second-best settings in which income taxes
distort leisure choice.
In this paper, we take as given that land and structures are taxed at the same rate,
without asking what political forces lead to the equality of rates that exists almost everywhere
and without asking whether taxes on pure land rents would generate suﬃcient government
revenue to obviate distortive taxes.2
We distinguish pure rents accruing to land owners from the cost of developing raw land.
Development generates costs of site preparation, which we assume to be constant in quantity,
and the opportunity cost of any foregone agricultural proﬁts, which we assume are zero.
Despite the importance of property taxes to overall public revenue, to our knowledge,
there has been no prior economic analysis of optimal commodity taxation under the con-
straint that land rents be taxed at the same rate as structures and raw land development.
The desirability of taxes on pure land rents has been familiar since at least George (1879),
and Haughwaut (2004) shows through a simulation that there is considerable deadweight
burden to failing to separate land from structure taxation in New York City. Papers that
have considered proﬁts in general, such as Munk (1978, 1980), and Auerbach and Hines
1Estimates based on US Census Bureau (2005) and US Oﬃce of Management and Budget (2005).
2Pittsburgh, PA has employed a land tax, as have some Commonwealth countries. Pure land rents are
subject to some federal taxation through capital gains taxes and taxes on rental income. Very large owner
housing capital gains are also taxed, and real property forms part of taxable estates. Back of the envelope
calculations suggest that conﬁscating land rents would generate revenues close to but most likely below total
current government spending levels. Davis and Heathcote (2004) estimate that residential land has a total
value equal to approximately 50 percent of one year’s gross domestic product. Assuming residential land is
worth at least two-thirds of total US land value, this implies that total land value is less than 75 percent of
one year’s GDP. Even if the rental dividend and capital gains summed to as much as high as 10 percent,
that would mean conﬁscation of land rents would generate revenues equal to 7.5 percent of GDP each year.
Federal state and local spending, exclusive of deﬁned beneﬁt programs, appears to be slightly above this
level. Counting deﬁned beneﬁts, the gap is much larger.
2(2003), suggest that the presence of land rents may lead to important modiﬁcations to the
ﬁrst order conditions that characterize second-best commodity taxes. However, these papers
do not provide clear guidance on how the presence of land rents aﬀects actual tax rates.
Brueckner and Kim (2003) show that property taxes have ambiguous eﬀects on the quantity
of land used by a ﬁxed number of consumers, but do not consider the eﬃciency of property
taxes in a world with alternative sources of revenue and elastic labor supply.
Our analysis shows that the optimal property tax rate is increasing in the ratio of land
rents to total property value. While this result holds quite generally and may seem obvious,
there are important US policies that result in reduced eﬀective tax rates on housing in
the ratio of land rent to property value. The best known examples of states with limited
property taxes and high income taxes are California and Massachusetts, states in which land
value represents a relatively very large fraction of property value. At the federal level, as
documented by Gyourko and Sinai (2003), tax beneﬁts to homeownership are concentrated
in Coastal states. Again, these are states where we show that the tax burden on housing
should be the highest, not the lowest.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these geographic phenomena. Each of these ﬁgures uses a
measure of land cost per acre as a proxy for the share of land rents in real estate values.
This is a valid approximation if variation in land costs is driven more by residential potential
than by agricultural opportunity cost and if the elasticity of substitution between land and
structures is less than one. We regard both of these as most likely true.
Figure 1 demonstrates that there is a positive but weak empirical relationship between
land costs and the share of state and local revenues generated by property taxes. Despite
the weak relationship, California clearly has among the highest land values and among the
lowest property tax rates, particularly among large states. California has notably draconian
property tax limitations, due to Proposition 13, which cut property tax rates upon passage
and exempts capital gains on homes from property taxation, as well as the Serrano rul-
ing, which provides a very strong disincentive to raise property tax rates. Massachusetts’
Proposition 2 1
2 places weaker constraints on local governments, as indicated by that state’s
relatively normal ratio of land value to property tax burden.3
Figure 2 shows that there is a strong positive relationship between land values and federal
tax subsidies to homeowners. In sum, the tax burden on owner occupied housing, by far the
largest component of real estate value, appears empirically to decrease rather than increase
with the land rent share of value.
A second notable result follows from the analysis of Munk (1978): proportional taxation
3We cannot be certain whether California has it wrong or if the other 49 states do, as our result concerns
relative, not absolute optimal property tax levels.
3Figure 1: Relationship between land value and property tax share of total state and local
revenues, US States in 2002





































































































































Notes: Land value at the state level is approximated by the maximal per acre value of farm real estate
in the 2002 US Agricultural Census within each US state. The maximal value is considered because most
real estate is located in urbanized areas, so that an average across counties would not be representative.
Variation in land values is driven primarily by residential potential, as can be inferred from perusal of land
listings at realtor.com. Property tax share is measured as total state and (almost entirely local) property
tax revenue divided by total state and local revenue. Bubble sizes are proportional to state population. Tax
data comes from the 2002 Census of Governments.
4Figure 2: Relationship between land value and federal subsidies to homeownership











































































































































Notes: Land value at the state level is approximated by the maximal per acre value of farm real estate in
the 2002 US Agricultural Census within each US state. The maximal value is considered because most real
estate is located in urbanized areas, so that an average across counties would not be representative. Variation
in land values is driven primarily by residential potential, as can be inferred from perusal of land listings at
realtor.com. Federal tax subsidies are calculated based on data presented in Gyourko and Sinai (2004) and
our own division of two ﬁgures presented therein. The numerator of the subsidy rate is the total dollars of
federal homeownership subsidies and the denominator is the total value of owner occupied housing. Part of
the subsidy is attributable to the act of homeownership, and these subsidies are not available to residential
or commercial landlords. Bubble sizes are proportional to state population.
5of non-housing commodities is generally not optimal, even with equal compensated elastic-
ities with respect to the wage rate. Land development and consumption of structures are
discouraged by property taxes, so there is reason for the tax code to subsidize complements
for these goods, including real estate development itself, and tax substitutes.
This ﬁnding, reminiscent of the analysis of Goulder and Williams (2003), suggests that
“anti-sprawl” measures that further discourage raw land development have previously uniden-
tiﬁed adverse consequences. However, consideration of property values dictates consideration
of the geographical distribution of employment. In a “monocentric city” setting, we ﬁnd that
if time costs dominate direct transportation costs of commuting, then anti-sprawl measures
such as land use regulations and transportation taxes can be welfare improving. This pos-
sibility arises because anti-sprawl measures reduce the distortion to labor supply caused by
income taxes. This condition happens to be most likely met in the same markets that should
have high property tax rates due to high land values. Anti-growth measures thus appear
better geographically distributed than property tax burdens. In general, it is not easy to
dismiss regulation of property markets on eﬃciency grounds, even absent externalities.
We generate analytical results concerning property taxes in a very simple, static setting.
We consider a Robinson Crusoe economy with the sole complication that land on Crusoe’s
island is in limited supply and thereby generates pure proﬁts. We introduce the possibility
of occupying land not located on the island (such as swimming in the ocean) as a crude
means of allowing for diﬀerentiated land quality. We then test our analytical results through
simulations of the more developed, but still stylized, monocentric city model adapted by
Alonso (1960) from the work of von Thunen and further explicated by, e.g., Wheaton (1977).
In this model, the diﬀerentiation of land is based on continuous distance from a single
employment center.
The result that property taxes should be higher where land value is greater should be
robust to changing the speciﬁcation of what drives land value and to considerations of con-
gestion or environmental externalities. However, our results concerning the desirability of
anti-sprawl measures would likely require modiﬁcation if we allowed for the development
of endogenous subcenters, as in Helsley and Sullivan (1991) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002) or if we considered congestion or environmental quality.
We consider taxation in a “city state,” in that only a single public good is ﬁnanced by
income, property, and commodity income taxes and in that there is no potential for mobility
or sorting across communities. To the extent that local and federal spending needs are ﬁxed,
we can interpret the optimal level of the property tax as reﬂecting the optimal sum of local
and federal taxes on property.
We do not address redistributive considerations, inter-jurisdictional strategic behavior,
6or local political economy. Issues such as the desirability of encouraging Tiebout sorting
through property tax deductibility in a world with distortive redistribution are thus left to
future research. Land use controls play an important role in the extent of Tiebout sorting,
so we view our results on their desirability as complementary to results found elsewhere,
rather than as a ﬁnal word.4
The roles of savings decisions and investment dynamics in housing markets are pushed
aside because we consider a static model, meant to approximate a steady state. Again, we
do not see this approximation as a problem for the interpretation of our result that property
taxes should be greater in areas where land values represent a large share of property values.
However, the desirability of subsidies for commodities that are complements to structures
and raw land development hinges on whether the net eﬀect of taxes on housing prices is
greater than or less than the eﬀect on all other commodities.
The literature on the welfare consequences of asymmetric treatment of housing to date,
e.g. Rosen (1985), Berkovec and Fullerton (1992), and Gervais (2002), has focused on the
various ways in which the federal tax code favors investment in housing over investment in
other forms of capital. We suspect that the net eﬀect of federal, state, and local taxes is to
place a burden on the consumption of housing commodities relative to other commodities,
but leave the accounting exercise to future research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents analytical results
in the island setting. In Section 3, we draw analogies between the island economy and the
“monocentric city” environment and describe numerical simulations of such an economy that
generally conﬁrm the analytical results of Section 2. Section 4 concludes.
2 Analysis of an Island Economy
2.1 Land Set Up
We consider an individual who lives on an island and does not trade with the outside world.
We assume that demand for island land is suﬃciently strong that under all the optimal or
constrained optimal tax schemes we consider, all of the island’s land area, ¯ L, is occupied
and the after-tax price that the consumer is willing to pay for land, qL, exceeds the cost of
readying land for consumption. We deﬁne units of island land and all commodities so that
the cost of producing one unit, absent taxes, is equal to one unit of a numeraire commodity.
4If sorting across jurisdictions of housing value is strong, then residential property taxes provide the payer
with services equivalent in cost to the tax. In this case the eﬀect of a tax on property on demand for all goods
is more complicated than we allow for in this setting. Empirically, jurisdictions are quite heterogeneous (see,
e.g. Epple and Sieg (1999), Davidoﬀ (Forthcoming)).
7We allow for the possibility that the individual might wish to consume additional land
somewhere other than the island. We assume that such land, consumed in quantity b, is
in inﬁnite supply at a constant cost of 1, but is less desirable than island land. We will
sometimes refer to L as “desirable” land and b as “border” land. This model, close to
that of Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2002), is meant to approximate a world in which land is
heterogeneous in value, and more valuable land close to amenities or highly compensated
employment is in short supply.
The consumer owns 100 percent of a price taking land development company that dis-
tributes proﬁts lump sum to the consumer. The ﬁrm thus takes a land price of
qL
1+τL. The
assumption that all land is consumed at any optimum leads to the following:









We assume that other than land, all commodities are produced using linear and reversible
technology. One unit of labor, z, produces one unit of a numeraire commodity c. This
consumption good can be converted one-for-one into housing structures h, any arbitrary
other good, g, or for development of land on or oﬀ the island. The consumer’s endogenous
valuation of a unit of land on the island is qL. We adopt the Debreu sign convention, so that
z is a negative number. As z falls, the amount of labor supplied increases. The tax rate on
labor τz is a negative number (since consumer price of labor is lower than producer price),
so that τzz is direct labor tax revenue.
We will at times make use of an assumption that island land is a hicksian substitute for
both border land and for structures. That is, we assume the derivative of hicksian demand
for island land with respect to both structures and border land is negative; notationally, we
write SLh ≤ 0, SLb ≤ 0. That diﬀerent types of land would be substitutes should not be
controversial. That land and structures would be substitutes may seem counter-intuitive.
However, Thorsnes (1997) ﬁnds that a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for housing development
cannot be rejected, implying hicksian substitution.5
5Making matters somewhat more complicated, island land will be built to a higher density than border
land (reﬂected in the familiar geographic density gradient), rendering island land relatively more complemen-
tary to structures than border land. In interpreting our results, we will assume that in areas with higher land
prices, land represents a larger fraction of real estate values. This is consistent with Cobb-Douglas production
as long as real land prices rise relative to structure prices over time (which they have, historically).
8The consumer’s preferences over c, b, g, L, and z give rise to an expenditure function
that is assumed to be well behaved in the sense that it is homogeneous of degree zero and is
increasing and concave in both prices and utility.
2.3 Government
The government requires G units of numeraire and wishes to raise this amount while leaving
the consumer as well oﬀ as possible. We consider taxation of labor income and other com-
modities, assuming the numeraire is untaxed and that the government takes limits on the
tax rate on pure proﬁts τπ and other commodity taxes, {τi}, as exogenously given.
As is standard in the optimal tax literature following Diamond and McFadden (1974),
we evaluate the “dual” problem for a welfare maximizing government. The government
minimizes the consumer expenditures required to attain utility level u given the proﬁts and
prices that arise from taxes suﬃcient to raise G in revenue. Mathematically, the problem is:
min
{τi},qL
L = E(q,u) − ¯ L(
qL
1 + τL











+µ(L − ¯ L) +
X
i∈Ω
φi(τi − ¯ τi). (3)
Notation is summarized in Table 1. We scale commodity units such that all non-land
producer prices (pi, i 6= L) are set equal to one. λ is the shadow value of a dollar of tax
revenue; because this is a minimization in which taxes are distortive, we know that this
value is greater than 1. The Lagrangian coeﬃcient µ can be interpreted as the welfare cost
or beneﬁt that would arise if a foreign entity were to oﬀer a small quantity of additional
island land for sale to the consumer at the price qL but would not redistribute proﬁts or pay
taxes. The government must obey this constraint that exactly ¯ L of island land is available
when setting tax rates, and hence implicitly changing the consumer price of land. The
Lagrangian coeﬃcients φi reﬂect the welfare eﬀect of increasing or decreasing the exogenously




τπ Tax on proﬁts, exogenously ﬁxed
τi, i 6= π Tax on commodity i
τL Common tax rate on L, h, and b.
φi Lagrangian coeﬃcient on the constraint that τi = ¯ τi.
Ω Set of tax rates that are constrained in the optimization
z Leisure (negative, as is its tax rate τz)
c Numeraire consumption, untaxed
L Land consumption
h Structure consumption
b Consumption of inferior quality land not located on the island.
g Any other good in inﬁnitely elastic supply.
λ Shadow value of an additional dollar of government revenue
µ Lagrangian coeﬃcient on the equality of land supply and demand.
Sij(ηij) Compensated derivative (elasticity) of demand for good i with respect
to the price of good j.
2.4 Optimal Tax Rules
If a tax on island land can raise all needed revenues, i.e. if G ≤ ¯ L(qL −1), then optimal tax
policy is to restrict taxation to proﬁts from island land. Such optimal taxation could arise
from either an island land tax or from a pure proﬁt tax. This follows from the lump sum
nature of proﬁt taxation and the satisfaction of the welfare theorems. Mathematically, the





(1 + τL)2(1 − λ). (4)
The net eﬀect is to reduce the minimand L because λ > 1 when taxes are distortive.
While the beneﬁts of proﬁt taxes are clear, we assume that τπ is constrained to equal zero
throughout the rest of this paper.
2.4.1 Optimal Constrained Property Taxes
In almost all jurisdictions in the United States, property taxes are levied at the same rate
on both land and structures, development costs are not exempt for owner occupied homes,
and agricultural land is taxed at agricultural opportunity cost rather than residential value.
Hence property taxes distort both structure consumption and the quantity of agricultural
land consumed. We thus assume that τh = τb = τL.
We now analyze the optimal unconstrained property tax rate τL under the assumption
10that all commodities other than other than income and property are untaxed, either through
constraints {¯ τi = 0} or because it is optimal not to tax these commodities. This case
warrants special focus because non-taxation of commodities (absent proﬁts) is optimal under
conditions ﬁrst identiﬁed by Corlett and Hague (1953). We consider whether commodity
taxes or subsidies are desirable from the starting point of zero commodity taxation below.
In this special case, denoting by Sij the compensated demand derivative of good i with




−1(H)(1−λ)−λ(τz (Szh + Szb) + τL(Shh + 2Sbh + Sbb))+µ(SLh +SLb). (5)
In equation(5), we have used the notation H ≡ L
qL
1+τL + (h + b)(1 + τL) to denote the
total opportunity cost of real property. Rearranging, we ﬁnd:
∂L
∂τL
= H(1 + τL)







(b + h)(1 + τL)
+ τL
Shh + 2Sbh + Sbb




(b + h)(1 + τL)

(b + h)(1 + τL)
H
As long as taxes generate welfare losses (so that λ > 1), the ﬁrst part of the right hand
side of equation (6) is negative. Hence, if τL is chosen optimally, so that ∂L
∂τL = 0, the second
part of the right hand side must be positive. This implies:
Result 1 All else equal, the optimal property tax rate is increasing in the ratio of island
land value to total real estate value. Also, if the ratio of land values to property values is
suﬃciently large, a move from pure labor tax to a mixed system of labor and property taxes
is welfare improving.
To provide some intuition, the ﬁrst part of the welfare eﬀect of a property tax is the gain
from a lump sum transfer from the consumer to the government. The second part is the
optimally adverse eﬀect of tax distortions to demand for structures and land development.
These distortions relate to weighted elasticities of the tax base and the demand for limited
island land with respect to the price of structures and border land. As the land share of
property value rises, property taxes’ welfare eﬀects approach those of a pure land tax.
2.5 Desirability of Commodity Taxes and Land Use Regulations
We now ask what the consequences of property taxes and land rents are for taxation of
non-housing commodities and for land use regulations. Before doing so, we recall a central
result of commodity tax theory due to Corlett and Hague (1953):
11Result 2 Suppose all elasticities of demand for all commodities with respect to the wage
rate ηiz are identical and that all goods (including land) are in inﬁnitely elastic supply. Then
the optimal tax rate on all commodities is zero.
With inelastic land supply, starting from taxes only on property and income (¯ τg = 0, ∀g),
we now consider the welfare eﬀect of a small tax on some commodity g. From the problem
(1), there is a welfare gain if φg > 0. To sign φg, we use the ﬁrst order condition:
φg = g(λ − 1) + λ(τzSzg + τL(Sgh + Sgb)) − µSLg. (7)
Proportional taxation of non-housing commodities is optimal only if all commodities g
have the same value (zero) for the right hand side of (7). However, equal compensated
elasticities with respect to wage rate are enough only to ensure that all commodities have
equal values for the ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side of equation (7). Proportional
taxation requires also equal compensated elasticities with respect to the price of structures
and both types of land. This condition is plainly violated for goods directly related to housing
or transportation and for related goods such as energy. The necessary deviations from
proportional taxation are likely considerable: transportation and housing alone represented
52 percent of US consumer expenditures in the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
If we assume that all commodities have equal demand elasticities with respect to the
wage rate and that structures and border land are substitutes for island land, then if µ > 0,
taxes are desirable on commodities that are complements for structures and border land and
that are substitutes for desirable land. This follows from the fact that the property tax forces
an otherwise border tax on structures and border land which leads to too little demand for
these commodities and too much demand for island land.
We now ask under which conditions a positive value for µ is plausible. Recall that a
positive value for µ implies that a welfare gain would arise if a price-taking foreign entity
were to oﬀer a small quantity of island land without sharing proﬁts or paying taxes. Optimal







(λ − 1) + λ(τzSzL + τL(SLh + SLb))

(8)
Equation (8) illustrates three eﬀects of adding foreign island land to the economy. The
ﬁrst eﬀect (unambiguously welfare destructive) is that property taxes on the taxable portion
of land fall. Second, if leisure and island land are substitutes, tax revenue increases, pushing
µ towards positivity. The third eﬀect, likely rendering µ negative, is substitution towards
island land and plausibly away from taxed structures and border land. While it is not easy
12to sign the net eﬀect, it is clear that µ is more likely to be positive as island land becomes
a stronger substitute for leisure and as the property tax rate falls.
From equations (6), (7), and (8), we obtain the following:
Result 3 From a starting point of taxes only on labor and property, welfare gains are larger
for small taxes on substitutes for structures and border land than for complements, and:
• If µ is positive, then a small tax (subsidy) on commodity g is more desirable if g is a
complement (substitute) for island land. This case is more likely as island land is a
stronger substitute for leisure and a weaker substitute for structures and border land,
so that the property tax is larger.
• If µ is negative, then a small tax (subsidy) is more desirable on commodities that are
substitutes (complements) for island land. This case is more likely as island land is
a stronger complement for leisure and a stronger substitute for structures and border
land, so that the property tax is smaller.
Complementarity with island land demand is relatively more important than with structure
and border land as island land demand is more inelastic.
Because property taxes discourage structures and border land, taxes are called for on
goods that further diminish demand for these goods and subsidies for goods that increase
their demand. This correction also operates through complementarities with land demand.
The commodity tax principles laid out in Result 3 provide some clear guidance with
respect to land use regulations. Regulations that discourage structures or development of
raw land are harmful not only for their distortive eﬀects, but also because they compound
the distortive eﬀects of property taxation.
If real property is net subsidized due to federal deductions and exemptions (we do not
think this is the case) then it is complements, rather than substitutes, for structures and raw
land development that should be taxed. Further, in that case, land use regulations that limit
the size of structures and discourage land development are welfare increasing. However, the
comparative statics laid out in Result 3 are unaﬀected by the sign of the property tax.
Result 3 makes clear that substitution between components of real property and labor
supply aﬀect optimal commodity taxation. Modern urban economics is focused on exactly
such relationships. Urban land is generally thought to hold value, that is to approximate
“island” instead of “border” land, in large part due to proximity to places of work. People
who must travel to work are compensated by lower prices for the undesirable land they
consume. If urban land consumption leads to greater labor supply, we know from Corlett
13and Hague (1953) that taxes and regulations should encourage urban land consumption and
discourage raw land development. If it is suburban land that is a greater substitute for labor,
the opposite will hold. As we will see in the next section, the nature of the costs to living
far from work critically determine whether island (urban) or border (suburban) land is a
stronger substitute for leisure.
3 The Monocentric City
In the Alonso (1960) model of land rents, value above opportunity cost does not arise from
an absolute limit on the quantity of developable land, but rather through diﬀerentiation of
better and worse locations. Well-located land is relatively valuable because consumers must
pay increasing transportation costs as the distance from their lot to a central location (their
place of work) grows.
In this section we present some theoretical and simulation results regarding property
taxation in the equilibrium characterized by diﬀerentiated land quality. Taxing proﬁts is
still optimal. In a numerical example we show that our theoretical results from the last
section carry over to the “monocentric city” framework, at least in the focal case of Cobb-
Douglas utility that we consider.
3.1 Description of the environment
A ﬁxed population of identical consumers now choose not just lot size but also a single
lot location. Living at a location of distance x from the origin of a half-line generates
transportation costs in numeraire of x × ρmoney and costs in time of x × ρtime. For the
consumers to be indiﬀerent among locations, it must be that land rents just compensate for
this. When lot size is freely chosen and untaxed, and when the border between agricultural
and residential land use is at distance ¯ x, rent at location x is given by
ψ(x) = RA +
Z ¯ x
x
ρmoney + ρtime(1 − τz)
L(s)
ds. (9)
This cost of a unit of land at distance x can be decomposed into the development cost RA
and the “land rent” or “proﬁt” represented by the integral in equation (9).
As above, all land is owned by development companies that distribute proﬁts in equal
shares to each consumer. We assume that this is a competitive industry and hence develop-
ment of land occurs up to the distance ¯ x where consumers’ willingness to pay for that land
equals the cost of development, RA. Land past ¯ x has no value.
14We parameterize the simulations to generate reasonable expenditure shares for land and
structures.6 Another goal of the parameterization is to generate suﬃcient land rents to fund
all government revenues. This does not reﬂect a strong belief that land rents could fund all
revenue needs, but rather provides a benchmark against which to measure the deadweight
loss arising from less eﬃcient tax schemes. In the main simulations presented, this leads to
a relatively small revenue requirement of less than 10 percent of output. As shown in Table
6 in the Appendix, the extent of deadweight loss from ineﬃcient taxation grows with the
government’s revenue needs once the land rent funding requirement is dropped.
We endow each consumer with the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U = ln(c) + 0.25ln(l) + 0.25ln(h) + ln(1 + z − ρtime ∗ x), (10)
where the time cost of travel ρtravel and the money cost of travel ρmoney are both set to be
.5 as a baseline. The gross wage is normalized to be one and the land return RA is set to .1.
Across simulations, total (labor) production in our economy ranged from 0.51 to .57. The
gross land proﬁts in this economy average approximately .07.
Under this formulation, land proﬁts are bounded because the source of land proﬁts (land
expenditures) are one quarter of consumption expenditure. As travel costs rise, demand
for location close to the center increases, rents rise and land consumption falls, with land
expenditures ﬁxed by functional form. Hence, the land rent share of aggregate property
value rises with travel costs.
3.2 Available tax and other policy tools
In this setting there are more policy tools available to the government than in our island
setting. We will consider the following tools: 1) land proﬁt taxes, 2) land taxes, 3) structure
taxes, 4) labor income taxes, 5) gasoline taxes, and 6) land use regulations.
Land proﬁt taxes are the only non-distorting taxes in this setting. Even constant ad
valorem taxes on land value) are distorting since they aﬀect the boundary condition for de-
velopment. Property taxes, as above, are assessed at equal rates on land rent and structures.
Gasoline taxes are proportional to commuting distance and land use regulations are non-
tax tools that allow the government to choose the boundary between developed and unused
land. Here, the justiﬁcation for these “environmental” interventions is that they provide
additional instruments beyond the property tax aﬀecting land consumption, which itself
6We generate expenditures of 50%. Direct expenditures on housing, not including capital gains or oppor-
tunity cost of capital (and excluding indirect real estate costs embedded in consumer goods) were 32% of
consumer expenditures in the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
15consists of two dimensions (consumption of location and development of raw land). We thus
suspect that welfare optimality of market gas prices and development extent would be a
knife-edge, despite the absence of any environmental or congestion externalities.
We consider only strict quantity constraints in terms of land use regulations, conjecturing
that location-speciﬁc, price-based regulation can do no worse. We allow the government to
choose between forced restrictions on the amount of land used in the equilibrium (through
growth boundaries such as implemented in the Portland, Oregon region) and “development
mandates” which require land developers past the break-even market distance ¯ x. A real world
analogy to these mandates is the subsidy to land development that occurs when suburban
developers do not bear the full cost of infrastructure and other public goods through impact
fees. A ﬁnding that pushing city limits past equilibrium levels is optimal implies that growth
controls impose eﬃciency costs.
3.3 Basic simulation results
In Table 2 we present the results of some basic simulations that do not allow for gas taxes
or growth controls. The simulations compare the eﬃciency and equilibrium properties of
diﬀerent tax regimes in our monocentric city speciﬁcation. All the comparisons are made
on a utility constant basis, where the underlying utility level is picked to correspond to the
equilibrium utility attained by consumers without any taxes or unearned income.
Before commenting on the properties of the diﬀerent tax instruments two general remarks
on the properties of equilibrium are warranted. First, under our Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
and baseline government revenue requirement (approximately 9% of the gross labor compen-
sation/production in the economy), no tax regime generates very large deadweight losses.
The average DWL ranges between 1 and 2 percent of the tax revenue. For the combination
of labor and property taxes, the marginal DWL equals approximately 4% of the additional
revenue.7 Second, the land price ratio between city center and agricultural land is smaller
than typically observed in metropolitan areas at only approximately 10.
Our basic simulations conﬁrm the eﬃciency of proﬁt taxation (it is also easy to show this
theoretically). If the only constraint on the equilibrium is lack of proﬁt taxes, so that land
and structures can be taxed at diﬀerent rates, then the optimal tax policy consists (mostly)
of land taxes and labor taxes at relatively high rates (land taxes at 25%). In this simulation
the revenue share is divided approximately 60-40 between labor and property taxes.
A move from unconstrained land and structure taxes to property taxes drastically changes
the structure of optimal taxes. The constrained optimal property tax rate is only 4.5% and
7The marginal DWL was calculated by discrete approximation evaluating a 1% increase in the govern-
ment’s revenue requirement.
16Table 2: Basic simulation results
Scenario I II III IV
Revenue requirement .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500
Travel Costs
Time cost of travel .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Money cost of travel .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Tax Rates
Labor tax .0000 .0530 .0927 .0770
Land Tax .0000 .2574 .0449
Structure Tax .0000 .0088 .0449
Proﬁt tax .6493
Revenue Shares
Labor tax .0000 .5805 1.0000 .8332
Land Tax .0000 .4024 .0834
Structure Tax .0000 .0171 .0834
Proﬁt tax 1.0000
Equilibrium Statistics
Total (Gross) Proﬁts .0770 .0571 .0731 .0704
Total Production .5615 .5480 .5391 .5410
Relative Output Eﬀect -.0241 -.0398 -.0364
Gross land price at center 1.0994 .8738 1.0530 1.0196
City border .2296 .2111 .2269 .2251
Relative Border Eﬀect -.0804 -.0117 -.0196
EV Calculation
EV from no tax .0500 .0506 .0511 .0510
EV from proﬁt tax .0000 .0006 .0011 .0010
Relative average DWL .0121 .0213 .0194
Note to Table 2. Scenarios: I) No constraints on the tax instruments, II) only labor tax, land tax and structures tax available,
III) only labor tax available and IV) only labor and property tax (land and structures at the same rate). The relative output
and relative border eﬀects measure the relative change in the respective variable from the eﬃcient tax (scenario I) baseline.
the revenue share of property taxes is only approximately 16%. Thus the distortion on
structures demand in our speciﬁcation has a huge eﬀect on the optimal tax policy.
Some of the results in Table 2 are sensitive to parameter choices. In terms of comparative
eﬃciency costs of the diﬀerent tax instrument sets, with the low revenue requirement, pure
labor taxes seem to have approximately twice the deadweight loss of unconstrained land,
structures and labor taxes. The policy set most relevant to real world applications (combi-
nation of property and labor taxes, scenario IV) has a deadweight loss that is closer to pure
labor taxes (scenario III) than to the unconstrained use of land, structures and labor taxes
(scenario II). We conclude in this scenario that the failure to separate land from structures
imposes considerable economic burden. With a larger government revenue requirement, as
demonstrated in Table 6 in the Appendix, the loss in disallowing separate land and struc-
ture taxes is considerably smaller than the loss in moving from property and income taxes
to income taxes alone. Further, the property tax share of revenue rises with revenue needs.
17The low deadweight burden in Table 2 is seen to be an artifact of low revenue needs.
3.4 The eﬀect of land value on optimal tax policy
Table 3: Land rents share of property value and tax policy
Scenario V VI VII VIII
Revenue Requirement .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500
Travel Cost
Time Cost .5000 1.0000 .2500 .0010
Money Cost .5000 1.0000 .2500 .0010
Tax Rates
Labor tax .0770 .0752 .0780 .0797
Land Tax .0449 .0600 .0314 -.0082
Structure Tax .0449 .0600 .0314 -.0082
Revenue Shares
Labor tax .8332 .7668 .8876 1.0270
Land Tax .0834 .1166 .0562 -.0135
Structure Tax .0834 .1166 .0562 -.0135
Total Net Expenditure
Land .0929 .0971 .0895 .0826
Structures .0929 .0971 .0895 .0826
Agricultural Land .0225 .0148 .0325 .0818
(b + h)/H .6211 .5763 .6816 .9950
Gross land price at center 1.0196 1.9144 .5656 .1019
City border .2251 .1483 .3250 .8177
Proﬁts .07046 .0823 .0570 .0008
Note to Table 3 Scenarios: V) our baseline case of property taxes with time cost and money cost of travel both set to .5, VI)
baseline with both travel cost doubled, VII) baseline with both travel cost halved and VIII) baseline with both travel costs set to
.001.
In columns V-VIII of Table 3, by varying travel costs (and hence the ratio of land proﬁts
to property value), we obtain the result consistent with our island model that the property
tax grows with the ratio of land rents to property values.8 In column VIII we show that
when the land proﬁts are trivially small we can generate negative optimal property taxes.
3.5 “Environmental” Policies
3.5.1 Gasoline taxes
In Columns IX-XII of Table 4 we show the results of expanding the policy set to include
gasoline taxes. Our simulations indicate that the level of gasoline taxes (and even whether
a tax or a subsidy is called for) depends crucially on the structure of real estate taxation.
8The variable (b+h)/H in the table is the after tax expenditure on land development and structures over
total real estate expenditure.
18Table 4: Gasoline taxes and land use policy
Scenario IX X XI XII XIII XIV
Revenue Requirement .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500
Travel Cost
Time Cost .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Money Cost .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Tax Rates
Labor tax .0000 .0526 .0859 .0727 .0759
Land Tax .0000 .3057 .0399 .0480 1.0000
Structure Tax .0000 .0069 .0399 .0480
Proﬁt tax .6493
Gas Tax .0000 -.0332 .0479 .0417
Revenue Shares
Labor tax .0000 .5766 .9290 .7883 .8223
Land Tax .0000 .4596 .0749 .0889 1.0000
Structure Tax .0000 .0135 .0749 .0889
Proﬁt tax 1.0000
Gas Tax .0000 -.0497 .0710 .0619
Equilibrium Statistics
Total (Gross) Proﬁts .0770 .0539 .0744 .0718 .0696 .0270
Total Production .5615 .5482 .5407 .5422 .5414 .5615
Relative Output Eﬀect -.0237 -.0371 -.0344 -.0358 .0000
Gross land price at center 1.0994 .8198 1.1043 1.0661 1.0110 .5496
Gross land price at border .0936 .0499
City border .2296 .2122 .2208 .2201 .2299 .2297
Relative Border Eﬀect -.0756 -.0380 -.0413 .0016 .0005
EV Calculation
EV from no tax .0500 .0506 .0510 .0509 .0510 .0500
EV from Proﬁt tax .0000 .0006 .0010 .0009 .0010 .0000
Relative average DWL .0117 .0198 .0184 .0191 .0000
Note to Table 4. Scenarios: IX) No constraints on the tax instruments, X) labor, land, structures and gas taxes available,
XI) only labor and gas taxes available, XII) labor, property and gas taxes available, XIII) labor taxes, property taxes and land
use policy available and XIV) land taxes and land use policy available. Gas tax is expressed as a unit tax distance traveled.
The discrepancy between city border in columns IX) and XIV) is due to less accurate algorithm (using numerical instead of
analytical derivatives) in column XIV). The value 1.000 for the land taxes in column XV) is purely incidental and has no
special signiﬁcance (in fact, it is not exactly equal to one with higher precision).
If land and structure taxes are unconstrained, then as shown in column X a gasoline
subsidy is called for. Like land use mandates in the next section, here gasoline subsidies are
used to mitigate the distortion of land taxes on the development boundary. Unlike land use
mandates, gasoline subsidies do not permit us to replicate ﬁrst best outcomes.
If, however, we are in the more realistic property tax setting or solely labor and gasoline
tax setting, then the second best intuitions seem to be a better guide for gasoline taxes.
As shown in columns XI and XII, these situations call for signiﬁcant taxation of gasoline
(raising approximately 7 percent of tax revenue through gasoline taxes). It seems that now
the interaction of gasoline tax with the time cost of travel is relevant for optimal policy:
19taxing gasoline makes individuals live closer to city center and hence less averse to supplying
labor. Simulations show in Table 7 in the Appendix show that increasing the time cost of
travel generate larger gasoline taxes and seem to validate this logic.
3.5.2 Land use policy
We now ask whether the government could by restricting land use (by setting a development
boundary) increase economic eﬃciency when the ﬁrst best tax policy tools are not available.
To this question our answer will be that it depends on the speciﬁc circumstances.
We will ﬁrst establish a result that points towards the completely opposite policy di-
rection: that it would be optimal to mandate development (or subsidize it using targeted
boundary subsidies) beyond the point where the ﬁrms themselves ﬁnd it proﬁtable to develop
if the government has to raise tax revenue without the use of proﬁt taxes.
Lemma 1 For a small government revenue requirement land use policy and unconstrained
land taxes can replicate the ﬁrst best outcome.























A sketch of proof of 1 is given in Figure 3. In the ﬁgure, the original land-market
equilibrium border is at b0. For simplicity the ﬁgure is drawn with a linear land-price
20Table 5: Travel cost and land use policy
Scenario XV XVI XVII XVIII
Revenue Requirement .0500 .0500 .5000 .0500
Travel Cost
Time Cost .5000 1.0000 .0000 5.0000
Money Cost .5000 .0000 1.0000 .0000
Tax Rates
Labor tax .0762 .0774 .0725 .0662
Land Tax .0474 .0614 .0424 .1137
Structure Tax .0474 .0614 .0424 .1137
Gross land price at center 1.0115 .9686 1.0467 4.2938
Gross land price at the border .0936 .1000 .0880 .1051
City border .2299 .2295 .2300 .0814
Note to Table 5. Scenarios: XV) Baseline property and gasoline tax with money and time cost of travel set to .05, XVI)
time cost set to 1, no money cost, XVII) money cost set to 1, no time cost and XVII) time cost set to 5, no money cost.
gradient. In this original equilibrium the proﬁts of the land developers are given by area
I+II. Holding utility constant, introduce a tax τL. This rotates the gross land-price gradient
down and would push the border to b1. Using the land development mandate the government
can push the border back to b0. Now proﬁts are equal to II-III. Government’s revenue equals
I+III. Simple calculation now shows that the change in proﬁts (and thus the change in
representative consumer’s unearned income) is equal to -I-III, i.e. minus one times the
government’s revenue. Thus this policy raises revenue with no deadweight loss.
We thus see that when land taxes are feasible and revenue requirements are small, im-
posing binding restriction on land use (as opposed to a building mandate) cannot be welfare
improving. Infrastructure subsidies that have the same eﬀect on the boundary as the man-
date can be welfare improving. Column XIV in Table 4 veriﬁes Lemma 1 numerically. In
Tables 4 and 5, we show the optimal cost of development at the urban fringe. In the absence
of development mandates or restrictions, the cost to developers is equal to .1.
Column XIII in Table 4 shows that in our baseline case this logic carries over to the
true second best situation where we incorporate land use policy with property and labor
taxation. Note that in this case the land use policy does not make much diﬀerence in terms
of eﬃciency.
Table 5 shows that as long as money costs of travel are not too much smaller than time
costs, development mandates are optimal. With a suﬃciently large relative time cost of travel
it is possible to overturn this result on undesirability of land use constraints (columns XVII,
where the border land value is with higher precision higher than .1 and XIX). Note that these
present a very moderate case for land use restrictions in these simulations raising the border
land price at most by approximately 5%. However, they leave open the possibility that
21with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of key parameters (including travel cost and utility functions)
a stronger case for land use constraints to augment property taxes. Further, we see that
development restrictions make more sense in regions where time costs are a relatively large
share of travel costs. Back of the envelope calculations strongly suggest that coastal areas
are thus more appropriate locations for development restrictions than are inland areas, and
this seems to match the distribution of regulations found by Linneman et al. (1990).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a framework for evaluating the optimal level of property
taxes under diﬀerent institutional settings and for understanding the interactions between
property taxes and other commodity taxes.
Property taxes make up an important part of both empirical and simulated optimal
government revenues. We ﬁnd in simulations that constraints on the set of available property
tax tools can generate relatively large deadweight burdens. In a Cobb-Douglas monocentric
city economy in which all revenues could be gained through a land proﬁt tax, there are
substantial distortions to ﬁrst failing to remove opportunity costs from taxed land rents and
second requiring a common tax rate on land and structures. As the revenue need rises, the
revenue share of property taxes also rises, so that the welfare cost of failing to tax property
at all rises relative to the cost of distorting land development and structure consumption.
We also ﬁnd that under preferences that satisfy conditions commonly thought to lead to
the optimality of proportional taxation, non-trivial taxes or subsidies may in fact be optimal
based on diﬀerent commodities’ complementarities with urban land. Conﬁrming conjectures
based on analysis of a Robinson Crusoe economy, we ﬁnd in a monocentric setting that the
desirability of “anti-sprawl” measures such as gasoline taxes or urban growth boundaries
hinges critically on whether travel costs stem mostly from time or direct costs.
Notably, some of our results contrast starkly with US tax policy. Whereas we ﬁnd that
property taxes should increase with the land share in real estate markets, tax limitations
in California and Massachusetts, as well as the geographic distribution of housing tax sub-
sidies, guarantee that the property tax burden is lowest in these states. A countervailing
consideration is that we might think of the United States as one large region, in which the
coastal states represent desirable land. If productivity is greater in these areas, we have seen
that policies which render these areas more attractive may undo some of the damage done to
labor supply through income taxation. This might excuse federal policy in part, but oﬀers
no excuse for the apparent irrationality of relative property tax burdens.
The geographic distribution of land use regulations appears more eﬃcient than the dis-
22tribution of tax burdens on real property. Land use regulations compound the distortion
of the property tax on demand for raw land development. In the coastal areas where raw
land is a smaller component of property values and time costs of travel have greater relative
weight than money costs, such constraints have more beneﬁcial eﬀects through increasing
the labor and land tax bases.
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25Appendix
Table 6: Revenue requirement and optimal tax policy
Scenario XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV
Revenue Requirement .1000 .1000 .1000 .2000 .2000 .2000
Travel Cost
Time Cost .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Money Cost .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Tax Rates
Labor tax .1189 .1529 .1963 .2736 .2907 .5630
Land Tax .5582 .1255 1.5998 .6159
Structure Tax .0289 .1255 .2166 .6159
Revenue Shares
Labor tax .6289 .7895 1.0000 .6364 .6506 1.0000
Land Tax .3441 .1053 .2820 .1747
Structure Tax .0270 .1053 .0816 .1747
EV Calculation
EV from no tax .1031 .1046 .1054 .2222 .2303 .2654
EV from proﬁt tax .0031 .0046 .0054 .0222 .0303 .0654
Relative average DWL .0306 .0463 .0539 .1109 .1517 .3272
Note to Table 6. Scenarios: XIX) higher revenue requirement, land taxes available, XX) higher revenue requirement, only
property and income taxes available, XXI) higher revenue requirement, only income taxes available, XXII) highest revenue
requirement, land taxes available, XXIII) highest revenue requirement, only property and income taxes available and XXIV)
highest revenue requirement, only income taxes available.
26Table 7: Gasoline taxes and travel cost composition
Scenario XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII
Revenue Requirement .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500
Travel Cost
Time Cost .5000 1.0000 0.0000 1.5000
Money Cost .5000 0.0000 1.0000 .0000
Tax Rates
Labor tax .0727 .0727 .0727 .0704
Land Tax .0399 .0399 .0399 .0482
Structure Tax .0399 .0399 .0399 .0482
Gas Tax .0417 .0781 .0054 .1217
Revenue Shares
Labor tax .7883 .7344 .8423 .6812
Land Tax .0749 .0749 .0749 .0929
Structure Tax .0749 .0749 .0749 .0929
Gas Tax .0619 .1158 .0080 .1330
Note to Table 7. Scenarios: XXV) baseline case with property, income and gasoline taxes, XXVI) same tax instruments,
only time cost of travel, XXVII) same tax instruments, only money cost of travel and XXVIII) same tax instruments, no
money cost of travel and time cost at higher level.
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